Mar. 23, 1995, D.C. Law 10-249, § 2(d), 42 DCR 467.)
1981 Ed., § 28:3-102.
Uniform Commercial Code Comment
1. Former Article 3 had no provision affirmatively stating its scope. Former Section 3-103 was a limitation on scope. In revised Article 3, Section 3-102 states that Article 3 applies to “negotiable instruments,” defined in Section 3-104. Section 3-104(b) also defines the term “instrument” as a synonym for “negotiable instrument.” In most places Article 3 uses the shorter term “instrument.” This follows the convention used in former Article 3.
2. The reference in former Section 3-103(1) to “documents of title” is omitted as superfluous because these documents contain no promise to pay money. The definition of “payment order” in Section 4A-103(a)(1)(iii) excludes drafts which are governed by Article 3. Section 3-102(a) makes clear that a payment order governed by Article 4A is not governed by Article 3. Thus, Article 3 and Article 4A are mutually exclusive.
Article 8 states in Section 8-103(d) that “A writing that is a security certificate is governed by this Article and not by Article 3, even though it also meets the requirements of that Article.“ Section 3-102(a) conforms to this provision. With respect to some promises or orders to pay money, there may be a question whether the promise or order is an instrument under Section 3-104(a) or a certificated security under Section 8-102(a)(4) and (15). Whether a writing is covered by Article 3 or Article 8 has important consequences. Among other things, under Section 8-207, the issuer of a certificated security may treat the registered owner as the owner for all purposes until the presentment for registration of a transfer. The issuer of a negotiable instrument, on the other hand, may discharge its obligation to pay the instrument only by paying a person entitled to enforce under Section 3-301. There are also important consequences to an indorser. An indorser of a security does not undertake the issuer’s obligation or make any warranty that the issuer will honor the underlying obligation, while an indorser of a negotiable instrument becomes secondarily liable on the underlying obligation. Amendments approved by the Permanent Editorial Board for Uniform Commercial Code November 4, 1995.
Ordinarily the distinction between instruments and certificated securities in non-bearer form should be relatively clear. A certificated security under Article 8 must be in registered form ( Section 8-102(a)(13)) so that it can be registered on the issuer’s records. By contrast, registration plays no part in Article 3. The distinction between an instrument and a certificated security in bearer form may be somewhat more difficult and will generally lie in the economic functions of the two writings. Ordinarily, negotiable instruments under Article 3 will be separate and distinct instruments, while certificated securities under Article 8 will be either one of a class or series or by their terms divisible into a class or series ( Section 8-102(a)(15)(ii)). Thus, a promissory note in bearer form could come under either Article 3 if it were simply an individual note, or under Article 8 if it were one of a series of notes or divisible into a series. An additional distinction is whether the instrument is of the type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized as a medium for investment ( Section 8-102(a)(15)(iii)). Thus, a check written in bearer form (i.e., a check made payable to “cash”) would not be a certificated security within Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Amendments approved by the Permanent Editorial Board for Uniform Commercial Code November 4, 1995.
Occasionally, a particular writing may fit the definition of both a negotiable instrument under Article 3 and of an investment security under Article 8. In such cases, the instrument is subject exclusively to the requirements of Article 8. Section 8-102(3)(d) and Section 3-102(a). Amendments approved by the permanent Editorial for Uniform Commercial Code November 4, 1995.
3. Although the terms of Article 3 apply to transactions by Federal Reserve Banks, federal preemption would make ineffective any Article 3 provision that conflicts with federal law. The activities of the Federal Reserve Banks are governed by regulations of the Federal Reserve Board and by operating circulars issued by the Reserve Banks themselves. In some instances, the operating circulars are issued pursuant to a Federal Reserve Board regulation. In other cases, the Reserve Bank issues the operating circular under its own authority under the Federal Reserve Act, subject to review by the Federal Reserve Board. Section 3-102(c) states that Federal Reserve Board regulations and operating circulars of the Federal Reserve Banks supersede any inconsistent provision of Article 3 to the extent of the inconsistency. Federal Reserve Board regulations, being valid exercises of regulatory authority pursuant to a federal statute, take precedence over state law if there is an inconsistency. Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 719 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.1983), reh. den. 724 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.1984). Section 3-102(c) treats operating circulars as having the same effect whether issued under the Reserve Bank’s own authority or under a Federal Reserve Board regulation. Federal statutes may also preempt Article 3. For example, the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq., provides that the Act and the regulations issued pursuant to the Act supersede any inconsistent provisions of the UCC. 12 U.S.C. § 4007(b).
4. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the Court held that if the United States is a party to an instrument, its rights and duties are governed by federal common law in the absence of a specific federal statute or regulation. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), the Court stated a three-pronged test to ascertain whether the federal common-law rule should follow the state rule. In most instances courts under the Kimbell test have shown a willingness to adopt UCC rules in formulating federal common law on the subject. In Kimbell the Court adopted the priorities rules of Article 9.
5. In 1989 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law completed a Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes. If the United States becomes a party to this Convention, the Convention will preempt state law with respect to international bills and notes governed by the Convention. Thus, an international bill of exchange or promissory note that meets the definition of instrument in Section 3-104 will not be governed by Article 3 if it is governed by the Convention.